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1 Introduction 
  
1.1 Presentation of the topic 
 
International human rights bodies that are entrusted with the competence to monitor the 
compliance by states with international human rights are empowered to issue provisional 
measures of protection in order to protect the rights of individuals, victims of alleged 
human rights violations. The question to what extent these provisional measures are 
binding on states has been a subject of a long-time debate. However, in recent years the 
main international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have expressed the view in their 
decisions that provisional measures are binding on states and that states have an 
international obligation to implement them. States have accepted the binding force of 
provisional measures issued by international courts and tribunals; however, there is not the 
same acceptance with regard to the provisional measures issued by quasi-judicial bodies.1  
 This paper analyses the binding nature of provisional measures issued by 
international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in light of the case law of these bodies 
regarding the issue. It reviews and compares the interpretations of the power to order 
binding provisional measures made by the International Court of Justice, the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the African Court on 
Human and People’s Rights as well as quasi-judicial bodies such as the UN Human Rights 
Committee, the UN Committee against Torture, the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights and the African Commission of Human Rights.  
 International human rights law has developed rapidly in the recent years. Human 
rights have become a key principle crossing through and shaping the content of the other 
                                                 
1 See Pasqualucci (2005) p. 2. 
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areas of international law. The numerous international human rights treaties, setting human 
rights standards and establishing the individual petition proceedings aimed at enforcing 
those standards, have increasingly restricted states’ sovereignty and their behavior. The 
subject of the thesis was chosen in order to demonstrate that the development regarding the 
binding force of provisional measures in international law proves that the process is 
continuing. 
 
1.2 The purpose of the thesis 
 
The aim of the thesis is to analyze to what extent provisional measures issued by 
international judicial and quasi-judicial human rights bodies are binding on states. The 
thesis considers the purpose of provisional measures in international law and examines the 
decisions of the aforementioned international bodies with the aim to answer the question 
what the legal basis for the authority of the international bodies to order binding 
provisional measures is.  
 
1.3 Sources and methodology 
 
The main legal sources used in the thesis are international treaties establishing the 
international human rights bodies. The constituent treaties enshrine the tasks and functions 
of the international institutions and express the specific powers they can exercise in order 
to fulfill those tasks and functions.  
 Therefore the paper refers to UN Charter and The Statute of the International Court 
of Justice2 which are the main international treaties establishing the International Court of 
Justice; the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11,3 which is the constituent treaty of the European 
                                                 
2 Adopted 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945. 
3 Adopted 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953. Protocol No. 11 entered into force on 1 November 
1998. 
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Court of Human Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights4 establishing the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and providing the Inter-American Commission 
with further functions and responsibilities; the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights5 which established the African Commission on Human Rights and the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment of the African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights6; also the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights7 which established the UN Human Rights Committee and the Optional 
Protocol8 to it which provided with individual petition procedure; and the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment9 which 
established the UN Committee against Torture.  
 For the discussion of the topic of the thesis, it is also important to refer to such 
internal decisions of these international organs as Rules of Procedure. Rules of Procedure 
provide the detailed specific procedures that are applicable to the daily operation and 
functioning of a certain organ.  
 The other legal source which is important in this thesis is the decisions of the 
international human rights bodies. According to article 38 § 1 of the Statute of ICJ which 
lists the sources of international law, judicial decisions may be applicable “as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law”. The provision contained in the 
aforementioned article is considered to be a rule of customary law. It means that it is 
applicable to the decisions of international judicial and arguably quasi-judicial bodies. 
Through the judicial practice the international bodies interpret their own provisions of 
constituent treaties, including the extent of their powers, rights and duties. They contribute 
to the interpretation and clarification of rules of international law. It is a significant source 
of law.  
                                                 
4 Adopted 22 November 1969. 
5 Adopted 27 June 1981, in force 21 October 1986. 
6 Adopted in June 1998 under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in force 25 January 
2004. 
7 Adopted 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976. 
8 Adopted 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976. 
9 Adopted 10 December 1984, in force 26 June 1987. 
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 The thesis was conducted through the research of legal literature on the matter and 
the analysis of case law of the international bodies available on their official websites. The 
paper presents and analyzes the most important case law where the aforementioned 
international bodies have pronounced on the binding nature of provisional measures. The 
cases have been selected according to the relevance to the topic while reading the annual 
reports of the abovementioned international organs. 
 
 
1.4 Demarcation of the thesis 
 
The paper analyses the power to order provisional measures mainly of the bodies entrusted 
with considering individual petitions or communications from individuals alleging human 
rights violations. It comprehensively examines the powers on the matter of the European 
Court of Human Rights since the European system is the most advanced regional human 
rights protection system. It also examines the powers of the main competent bodies of 
Inter-American human rights protection system as provisional measures are a well 
established institution and the binding force of provisional measures is the least contentious 
issue. It also pays attention to the African Human Rights system and analyses the powers of 
the newly established African Court on Human and People’s Rights. As an entitlement to 
order binding provisional measures by international quasi-judicial bodies is the most 
controversial issue to date, the paper reviews the powers and the jurisprudence regarding 
the issue of UN Human Rights Committee and UN Committee against Torture. 
In addition, the paper pays considerable attention to the International Court of Justice. 
Although ICJ is a court entrusted with competence to adjudicate disputes between states, it 
is important to examine its jurisprudence on the matter since ICJ’s decisions are an 
authoritative legal source having a great influence in the evolution of new rules in 
international law.  
 
 
 
 5
1.5 Terminology  
 
Different international law sources or legal literature use various terms to express the same 
meaning: provisional measures, interim measures, interim relief, interim protection, 
interim measures of protection or precautionary measures. In this paper the term 
provisional measures will be used unless a reference source provides with another term.  
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
 
Following the introduction part, the second chapter presents the general concept of 
provisional measures in international law, their origin and historical background. It 
examines what conditions required by international law are necessary for an order of 
provisional measures to be issued. It also discusses the problems that arise with an 
immediate implementation of an order of provisional measures in national legal systems. 
The third chapter analyses the binding nature of provisional measures in the light of 
international organizations law and the jurisprudence of the aforementioned international 
bodies. The fourth part presents the conclusions of the thesis. 
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2 Provisional Measures in General 
 
Provisional measures usually are granted by international courts or institutions in order to 
preserve the rights of the parties to a dispute from irreparable damage being caused to those 
rights which are the subject of the dispute pending a final decision in international 
proceedings.  
 
2.1 Origin and Historical Development of Provisional Measures 
 
Theoretically, provisional measures are derived from national law, from the requirement of 
procedural equality between the parties.10 This concept requires that both parties to a 
dispute would be treated equally and would have the same means and opportunities to 
defend their rights and interests during proceedings. If irreparable damage was done to the 
rights of one of the parties to such an extent that makes its restitution impossible, that party 
would be placed at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the other side. The fair balance and 
the procedural equality between the parties would be injured. Hence provisional protection 
is an effective legal tool to prevent such damage.  
The principles on which the institution of provisional measures is developed in 
modern law were borrowed from the Roman law.11 In both Common law and Civil law 
systems provisional measures have been used in order to protect property rights or the 
status quo pending trial.12  
                                                 
10 Letsas (2003) p. 527-538. 
11 In the Roman law the interdicts unde vi and uti possidetis were provisional remedies used in order to assure 
the protection of possession rights. See: Elkind (1981) p. 30-31.  
12 See: Elkind (1981) p. 25-30. 
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In international stage first provision in regard with provisional measures had been 
included in the Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice of 
20 December 1907, which read: 
From the moment in which any suit is instituted against any one or more 
governments up to that in which a final decision has been pronounced, 
the court may at the solicitation of any one of the Parties fix the situation 
in which the contending Parties must remain, to the end that the difficulty 
shall not be aggravated and that things shall be conserved in status quo 
pending a final decision.13 
 
The subsequent international treaties that all contained identical clauses on 
provisional measures were the Bryan Treaties – the Treaties for the Advancement of Peace 
– of 1914 concluded by the United States with China, France and Sweden. The treaties 
provided: 
In cases the cause of the dispute should consist of certain acts already 
committed or about to be committed, the Commission shall as soon as 
possible indicate what measures to preserve the rights of each party 
ought, in its opinion, to be taken provisionally and pending the delivery 
of its report. 14 
 
This provision served as an example for article 41 on provisional measures of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (further PCIJ), and later for article 
41 of the Statute of International Court of Justice (further ICJ). It is not the purpose of this 
thesis to provide the drafting history of article 41 of the Statute of PCIJ or the Statute of 
ICJ. However, it is worth briefly mentioning that the proposal to include the relevant 
provisions from The Bryan Treaties into the Statute of PCIJ was made by the Brazilian 
lawyer Raul Fernandez. The proposed provision was subsequently adopted with no major 
amendments. During the drafting process of the Statute of ICJ, which mainly followed the 
Statute of PCIJ, the procedural matters, including the provision on provisional measures, 
had been approved without discussion.15 Consequently, the provision empowering ICJ to 
indicate provisional measures today reads as follows: 
                                                 
13 The Statute of the International Court of Justice: a Commentary (2006) p.925. 
14 Elkind (1981) p. 41. 
15 See: The Statute of the International Court of Justice: a Commentary (2006) p.925-927. 
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The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that 
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be 
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. (Article 41 § 1) 
 
Clearly, this provision subsequently was used as a model for similar provisions of 
the statutes or rules of procedure of other international courts or quasi-judicial organs in the 
human rights field or in other fields of international law.  
 
2.2 Purpose of Provisional Measures 
 
The next question that has to be answered in this thesis is what the purpose of provisional 
measures in international law is.  
As ICJ put it in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case the purpose of provisional measures is “to 
preserve the respective rights of the parties pending the decision of the Court” and to 
ensure that “irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of 
dispute in judicial proceedings”.16 Clearly, in order to preserve the rights of another party, 
the parties to a dispute have to refrain from any action that might cause prejudice to those 
rights and to maintain the status quo. This approach is also supported by the general 
principle of international law, recognized already by the PCIJ in the Electricity Company of 
Sofia and Bulgaria case, that “parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of 
exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the decision to be given, and, in 
general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the 
dispute”.17 
Thus it is possible to conclude that provisional measures are ordered in international 
law with the aim: 
1) to preserve the rights of the parties to a dispute; 
                                                 
16 The Order of Provisional Measures of 13 September 1993, in Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) para. 35. 
17 The Order of Provisional measures of 5 December 1939, in Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, p. 
199. 
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2) to avoid irreparable damage to those rights by maintaining the status quo  
3) generally to prevent the aggravation or extension of the dispute. 
However the role of provisional measures ordered in human rights cases has a 
different nature. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (further IACtHR) stressed: 
[I]n international human rights law, the nature of provisional measures is 
not only preventative in the sense that they preserve the judicial situation, 
but fundamentally protective, because they protect human rights. 
Provided the basic requirements of extreme gravity and urgency and the 
prevention of irreparable damage to persons are met, provisional 
measures become a genuine jurisdictional guarantee of a preventative 
nature.18 
 
In international human rights law provisional measures are usually ordered to 
protect a potential victim from extradition or deportation to the countries where a person 
might face torture or death. It is also granted in the situations where applicants to 
international individual petition proceedings, their family members or legal representatives 
are in need of urgent protection because of the imminent danger to their lives or physical 
integrity. It is also granted in cases where victims are facing death sentences and at the 
same time the right to a fair trial is under consideration.  
An order of provisional measures may require that states take positive action such 
as providing police protection to the authors of individual petitions and their family 
members or witnesses, like in the Honduran Disappearance cases the IACtHR ordered the 
government to protect the witnesses that had received death threats. On the other hand, 
provisional measures may require states to refrain from any action while a case is pending 
before an international body, like in the case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. 
Trinidad and Tobago the IACtHR ordered the government to stay the executions of persons 
sentenced to death.19 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Pasqualucci (2003) p. 293, quoting the Order of Provisional measures of 6 December 2001, in The La 
Nacion Newspaper Case. 
19 Pasqualucci (2003) p. 294. 
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2.3 Conditions for the Order of Provisional Measures 
 
The adoption of provisional measures is a discretionary power of international courts and 
quasi-judicial bodies.20 This means that an international body is not bound to issue an order 
of provisional measures every time it receives such a request from a party, but it enjoys the 
discretion to decide whether provisional measures need to be ordered in a case and what 
type of measures should be ordered in those particular circumstances. In every case an 
international organ has to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case in order to 
decide if provisional measures are needed. However, this discretionary power of 
international bodies is conditional on the existence of exceptional circumstances which 
make it necessary to adopt provisional measures. Those circumstances are the existence of 
imminent danger of irreparable damage and extreme urgency.  
 Irreparable damage means such a prejudice done to the rights of the parties to a 
dispute which makes the restoration of the situation prior to an unlawful act and enjoyment 
of those rights impossible. There is no generally applicable test in international law which 
would help to measure whether a threatening damage is irreparable or not.21 An 
international body has to determine this according to the circumstances of a case. However, 
a damage threatening the lives and the physical integrity of individuals is clearly of 
irreparable nature. For example, in the LaGrand case the irreparable damage was obvious 
since the imminent execution of convicted persons was at issue. Therefore, in human rights 
cases provisional measures is an effective tool to protect individuals from death or 
prejudice to their physical integrity. 
 Irreparable damage has to be of imminent danger. This means that the case becomes 
urgent. This criterion of urgency is a significant one to justify the adoption of any 
provisional measures. If a situation is not urgent, there is no need for provisional measures. 
However, in cases of executions, deportations and extraditions there is an element of 
urgency. This requires an international body to act quickly. The consideration of necessity 
                                                 
20 Pasqualucci (2003) p.300; and The Statute of the International Court of Justice: a Commentary (2006) p. 
930. 
21 The Statute of the International Court of Justice: a Commentary (2006) p. 940. 
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of provisional measures becomes a matter of first priority. After provisional measures are 
ordered, they have to be implemented immediately by the authorities of a state.  
 
2.4 Implementation of the Order of Provisional Measures 
 
Imminent danger of irreparable damage and urgency in the situation require that states 
would be capable of implementing provisional measures immediately. Orders of 
provisional measures issued by international bodies are “general in nature”22 in the sense 
that they do not specify what concrete actions states’ authorities need to take, usually 
stating that a state “shall take all measures necessary to ensure”23 the required result. This 
means that states are allowed a margin of appreciation24 and can decide themselves how to 
implement provisional measures. 
However, implementation of an international order has legal effects in national law. 
This entails that municipal legal systems have to be adjusted in such a manner that an 
international legal order of provisional measures would have a direct legal effect in national 
law. This situation arose in the LaGrand case (the facts of the case are presented below) 
where the order of provisional measures issued by ICJ was not implemented by the United 
States authorities because of, as the United States government argued, “extraordinarily 
short time between issuance of the Court’s Order and the time set for the execution” and 
because of “the character of the United States of America as a federal republic of divided 
powers”.25 Indeed the urgency of a situation might require an immediate action of state 
authorities, since sometimes as witnessed in the LaGrand case, it can be a matter of hours. 
In addition, state authorities need to have legal means for making an order of provisional 
measures effective whatever the level of governance is. In the LaGrand case the Order of 
provisional measures of 3 March 1999 indicated two measures to the government of the 
United States, the first of which demanded the government to “take all measures at its 
                                                 
22 Pasqualucci (2003) p. 312. 
23 The Order of Provisional Measures of 5 February 2003 in Avena (Mexico v. US) para. 59.  
24 Pasqualucci (2003) p. 312. 
25 LaGrand (Germany v. US), para. 95. 
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disposal to ensure that [the convicted person] is not executed pending the final decision in 
the proceedings”, while the second required to “transmit the Order to the Governor of 
Arizona”.26 As ICJ concluded in the final judgment the mere transmission of the order of 
provisional measures to the Governor of Arizona was not sufficient action for the 
provisional measures to be implemented. There could have been done more in order to 
hinder the execution of the convicted individual. The case illustrates that problems may 
arise in implementing provisional measures in states where several levels of governance 
exist. Therefore states are obliged to implement the relevant amendments in their national 
legal systems in order to ensure that orders of international bodies are complied with. 
 
                                                 
26 The Order of Provisional Measures of 3 March 1999, in LaGrand (Germany v. US), para. 29. 
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3 The Binding Nature of Provisional Measures 
 
The question to what extent provisional measures are binding on states has been a subject 
of a long-standing debate. In recent years the main international judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies have expressed the view in their jurisprudence that provisional measures are binding 
on states and that states have an international obligation to implement them. States have 
accepted the binding force of provisional measures issued by international courts and 
tribunals; however, there is not the same degree of acceptance with regard to the 
provisional measures issued by quasi-judicial bodies.27  
International judicial or quasi-judicial bodies entrusted with competence to receive 
and examine individual complaints from individuals alleging human rights violations must 
have a right to order provisional measures binding on states which have accepted that 
competence. The aim of international individual petition proceedings is the protection of 
human rights. The right to petition international body is an international procedural right 
granted to individuals directly by international human rights treaties.28 States that ratified 
those treaties have committed themselves to respect that right of individuals under its 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, as the European Court of Human Rights (further ECtHR) 
pronounced in its jurisprudence (discussed below), states have an obligation to refrain from 
any action that might hinder an individual from exercising that right. International bodies, 
on the other hand, must have a power to intervene by ordering binding provisional 
measures. This power is necessary for the effective functioning of international individual 
petition proceedings. The next question that will be discussed in this chapter is what the 
legal basis of the power to order binding provisional measures is. The issue will be 
examined in the light of law of international organizations and the jurisprudence of 
international bodies. 
                                                 
27 See Pasqualucci (2005) p. 2. 
28 Cassese (2005) p. 147. 
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3.1 Express, Implied and Inherent Power to Order Provisional Measures 
 
The power to order provisional measures may be expressly provided for in the treaty 
establishing international body. In such a case, the power is not disputed. Furthermore, 
orders of provisional measures are internal decisions of an international body and in 
accordance with the law of international organizations internal decisions made by organs of 
international organizations are binding on member states.29 It is arguable whether orders of 
provisional measures are just procedural measures. They are more than procedural 
decisions because they provide for a new level of protection of human rights.30 Still they 
are internal decisions and are binding on states that ratified the constituent treaties of those 
international bodies and in such a way accepted their jurisdiction. Thus the Statue of ICJ 
expressly empowers ICJ to order provisional measures, American Convention of Human 
Rights provide with such a power the IACtHR and the Protocol establishing the African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights empowers it to order provisional measures. (The 
exact provisions are discussed below.) 
 In legal literature it is argued that international courts and tribunals that are bodies 
of judicial nature have an inherent power to order provisional measures. This power derives 
from the principle of effectiveness of judicial function. 31 The Intern-American Court has 
expressed this view in one of its first contentious cases Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras 
where the IACtHR based its power to order provisional measures to the state of Honduras 
on its “character as a judicial body and the powers that drive therefrom”.32 ICJ in the 
LaGrand case based the binding character of provisional measures on the effectiveness of 
judicial function, 33 which means that inherent powers of an international court or tribunal 
give a basis for issuance of binding provisional measures. This may be well applied by the 
ECtHR since its constituent treaty is silent about its right to order provisional measures and 
only its Rules of Procedure authorize it to take such action.  
                                                 
29 White (1996) p. 87.  
30 See: Developments of International Law in Treaty Making (2005) p. 574.  
31 See Pasqualucci (2005) p. 13-14. 
32 Ibid. p. 14. 
33 ICJ’s judgment in this case discussed in detail below. 
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 Finally, the law of international organizations uses such a concept like implied 
powers doctrine. This means that an international organization and its organs must have 
those powers that, even though not expressly provided for in the constituent documents of 
the organs, are necessary for the fulfillment of organization’s aims and tasks.34 This 
doctrine was supported by ICJ in the Reparation case where it stated in regard to the UN 
that “under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers 
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary 
implication as being essential to the performance of its duties”.35 Implied powers doctrine 
could be applied also to the quasi-judicial bodies such as the UN Human Rights 
Committee, the UN Committee against Torture, the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights and the African Commission of Human Rights since they lack competence to render 
binding decisions to its members states, however, at the same time they fulfill very 
important task that is protection of human rights through exercise of individual petition 
proceedings. In order to fulfill this task these bodies are in essential need to have a power 
to order binding provisional measures.  
 
                                                 
34 White (1996) p. 129. 
35 Reparation, para. 182. 
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3.2 The Jurisprudence of International and Regional Tribunals 
 
This part of the thesis presents and discusses the landmark decisions of the International 
Court of Justice (further the ICJ) and the main regional human rights courts such as the 
European Court of Human Rights (further the ECtHR), The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (further the IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights 
(further the African Court) where they ruled that provisional measures are binding on states 
members and they have an international obligation to implement provisional measures.  
 
3.2.1 International Court of Justice 
 
ICJ’s power to indicate provisional measures is enshrined in article 41 of the Statute of ICJ, 
which provides: 
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that 
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be 
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.  
2. Pending the final decision, notice of measures suggested shall 
forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council.  
 
Further regulation is given in ICJ’s Rules of Procedure, articles 73 to 78. 
The not so strong wording of the provision in Article 41 § 1 has become a basic 
argument against the binding effect of provisional measures.36 Another argument against it 
is that an order of provisional measures is not a decision within the meaning of Article 94 
§ 1 of the UN Charter37, since the latter is understood as a judgment of ICJ. Although 
provisional measures are not judgments, they are procedural decisions of the Court that are 
obligatory; otherwise the Court would be hindered to work effectively. This view is also 
                                                 
36 For the analysis of the wording of the provision and the preparatory work in favor of the binding effect see 
the Separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry. In the Order of Provisional Measures of 13 September 1993, in 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
&Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia). 
37 Article 94 § 1 of the Charter states: “Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.” 
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supported by article 78 of the Rules of Procedure, which empowers the Court to request 
information from states on the implementation of provisional measures that have been 
indicated.38 
While deciding on a state’s request for provisional measures, ICJ need not satisfy 
itself that is has jurisdiction on the merits of the case. Since provisional measures require 
urgent action, ICJ can order provisional measures, if there is a prima facie basis for 
jurisdiction. It is possible that at the later stage the Court can find that it lacks jurisdiction 
on a case. If provisional measures are binding, a state would be bound by an order without 
its consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. This would mean an interference with the state 
sovereignty.39 However, if the purpose of a provisional measure issued by ICJ is to protect 
human rights, states should be bound by it even before the findings on contested 
jurisdiction were taken. 
The issue of the binding nature of provisional measures for the first time ICJ 
handled in the LaGrand case. Until then, ICJ did not address the question, except in the 
Nicaragua case where it more clearly stated that when the Court finds that the situation 
requires that provisional measures should be taken, “it is incumbent on each party to take 
the Court’s indications seriously into account, and not to direct its conduct solely by 
reference to what it believes to be its rights”.40 
 
3.2.1.1 The LaGrand case 
 
In the LaGrand case the issue was addressed in the face of dramatic circumstances. 
Karl and Walter LaGrands were German nationals permanently residing in the United 
States. In 1982 they were arrested in the state of Arizona and charged with murder and 
attempted bank robbery. Later in trial they were found guilty and sentenced to death. In 
1992 the brothers became aware that the United States was in breach of its obligation under 
                                                 
38 The Statute of the International Court of Justice: a Commentary (2006) p. 954. 
39 The Statute of the International Court of Justice: a Commentary (2006) p. 953. 
40 Judgment of 27 June 1986 in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
US), para. 289. 
 18
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (further VCCR) to inform them of their 
rights to consular assistance. Subsequently, the LaGrands raised the issue in later appeal 
proceedings, but their claims were repeatedly rejected on the basis of the national 
“procedural default” doctrine, under which new issues can not be raised in federal criminal 
proceedings if they have not been raised in state’s proceedings. Despite Germany’s 
diplomatic efforts to prevent the execution of the LaGrands, Karl LaGrand was executed on 
24 February 1999. 
On 2 March 1999, the day before the scheduled execution of Walter LaGrand, 
Germany instituted the proceedings against the United States at the ICJ. In its application 
Germany claimed that the United States, by failing to inform the defendants of their rights 
under the Article 36 § 1(b) of the VCCR, violated its international obligations to Germany 
under the Convention. The application was followed by Germany’s urgent request for 
provisional measures to prevent the execution of the other brother. By an Order of 3 March 
1999, after finding that the circumstances required an order of provisional measures as a 
matter of the greatest urgency and without any other proceedings, the Court indicated 
provisional measures where it stated that the United States “should take all measures at its 
disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these 
proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken in 
implementation of this Order”.41 It is important to mention that in the same order ICJ 
stressed that the Governor of Arizona “is under the obligation to act in conformity with 
international undertakings of the United States”.42 Despite the Court’s order, Walter 
LaGrand was executed the same day some hours later. 
In its submissions on the merits Germany requested the Court to declare not only 
that the United States violated Germany’s rights under the VCCR, but also that the United 
States violated its international legal obligation to comply with the Court’s order of 
provisional measures. The United States argued that orders of provisional measures do not 
have binding effect.  
                                                 
41 The Order of Provisional Measures of 3 March 1999, in LaGrand (Germany v. US), para. 29. 
42 Ibid., para. 28. 
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In order to determine this long-time controversial question, ICJ chose the 
interpretation of article 41 of the Statute in accordance with customary international law on 
interpretation of international treaties reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT). After examining the English and the French equally authentic versions of 
article 41 and after reaching the conclusion that the two texts have different meaning and 
do not help in answering the question, the majority in the Court relied on article 33 § 4 of 
the VCLT, which reads “when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of 
meaning which the application of Articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which 
best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be 
adopted”.43 
ICJ stressed that the object and purpose of the Statute is to enable the Court to 
exercise its main function which is to settle international disputes by issuing binding 
decisions. It stated: 
The context in which Article 41 has to be seen within the Statute is 
to prevent the Court from being hampered in the exercise of its 
functions because the respective rights of the parties to a dispute before 
the Court are not preserved. It follows from the object and purpose of 
the Statute, as well as from the terms of Article 41 when read in their 
context, that the power to indicate provisional measures entails that 
such measures should be binding, inasmuch as the power in question is 
based on the necessity, when the circumstances call for it, to safeguard, 
and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the 
final judgment of the Court. The contention that provisional measures 
indicated under Article 41 might not be binding would be contrary to 
the object and purpose of that Article.44  
 
ICJ also referred to the Article 94 § 1 of the UN Charter and noted that the word 
decision in the provision may be interpreted as any decision rendered by the Court, 
including orders of provisional measures. Such interpretation would confirm the binding 
nature of provisional measures. However, interpretation of the word decision as meaning 
only judgments rendered by the Court would in no way preclude orders made under article 
                                                 
43 LaGrand (Germany v. US), para. 101. 
44Ibid., para. 102. 
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41 from having a binding character.45 Consequently, the Court held that the United States 
violated not only the VCCR, but also its international binding obligation to comply with the 
order of provisional measures.  
Thus ICJ based the binding character of provisional measures on the effectiveness 
of judicial function. The effective exercise of judicial function is dependent on the 
prevention of irreparable damage to the rights of the parties to a dispute pending final 
decision.  
 
 
3.2.1.2 The individual rights element in the LaGrand case 
 
It is important to mention that ICJ has a competence to settle disputes between 
states.46 In its practice ICJ has ordered provisional measures not only to protect rights of 
states, but also human rights of individuals when compliance with those human rights 
obligations was the subject of a dispute.47 In some cases by ordering provisional measures, 
the Court took into account human rights of individuals which went beyond the scope of a 
dispute.48 In this way ICJ widens the extent to which provisional measures can be indicated 
and departs from the strict scope of inter-state disputes.  
The significance of the LaGrand case is that it dealt not only with state rights but 
also with individual rights. ICJ held that article 36 of the VCCR, in addition to a state’s 
right to provide consular assistance to its nationals, also creates individual rights, which can 
be invoked in ICJ by the national state of an individual.49 It is important to stress that the 
provisional measures in the case were ordered with the intention to protect the life of the 
individual sentenced to death. In its submissions in oral pleadings Germany argued that the 
                                                 
45 LaGrand (Germany v. US), para. 108. 
46 Article 34 and 36 of the Statute of ICJ. 
47The Order of Provisional Measures of 8 April 1993 in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia &Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia); the Order of Provisional 
measures of 15 December 1979 in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran). 
48 See: Interim Measures for the Protection of Human Rights by Rosalyn Higgins. In: Politics, Values and 
Functions: International Law in the 21st Century. 1997. pp. 87-103. 
49 LaGrand (Germany v. the United States) para. 77. 
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right to information on consular assistance is an individual human right and constitutes one 
of the minimum guarantees for a fair trial in the sense of article 14 of the ICCPR. The 
compliance with it becomes mandatory in cases involving death penalties. Consequently, 
Germany argued that the violation of article 36 of VCCR as a guarantee for a fair trial 
followed by the execution would constitute the violation of the right to life as enshrined in 
article 6 of ICCPR.50 Even though ICJ did not go so far as to recognize the right to 
information on consular assistance as a human right, it is no doubt that the link between the 
consular rights and the death penalty was the cause that made the Court to rule in favor of 
the binding effect of provisional measures. Clearly “the irreversible harm inflicted on an 
individual would hardly justify the view that the Court’s interim order was just an 
expression of a desire or recommendation to spare the life of an individual”.51 Therefore 
the individual rights element was the key issue in the Court’s holding. 
Thus ICJ ruled that orders of provisional measures are binding on states. According 
to article 59 of the ICJ Statute, decisions of the Court have no binding effect except 
between the parties and in respect to that particular case. Even though ICJ has no power to 
make law, its decisions, including the LaGrand judgment, have a crucial importance in the 
evolution of new rules of international law. 
 
 
                                                 
50 Tinta (2001) p. 365. 
51 Letsas (2003) p. 527-538. 
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3.2.2 The European Court of Human Rights 
 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11 (further the ECHR) contain no explicit provision 
empowering the European Court of Human Rights (further the ECtHR) to order provisional 
measures. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides the ECtHR with such a power. According 
to the provision the competent Chamber or its President may indicate to the parties any 
provisional measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or 
of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it. The Chamber may request information 
from the parties on the matters concerning implementation of the interim measures. The 
provisional measures may be indicated at the request of a party or of any person concerned, 
or on the ECtHR’s own motion.52 The use of the word indicate in stead of order and 
generally cautious language in the provision gives an assumption that initially the provision 
was not designed to give binding effect to the ECtHR’s provisional measures.  
In the European human rights system provisional measures mainly are granted in 
cases having the extraterritorial effect of the ECHR,53 which means cases concerning 
deportation or extradition to third countries where an applicant may face death or ill-
treatment in the sense of articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. For example, the provisional 
measures were sought and granted in the case Soering v. UK, where the applicant was 
facing extradition to the United States, where he was sentenced to death for murder. 
Additionally, the ECtHR applies Rule 39 only if there is an imminent risk of irreparable 
damage.54 
In most cases provisional measures are indicated to respondent governments, 
although there were cases where the ECtHR indicated such measures to applicants. For 
example, in Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia the provisional measure was 
addressed to the applicant to stop the hunger strike.55 
                                                 
52 The Rules of Court (November 2003), Rule 39 (Interim measures). 
53 Letsas (2003) p. 527-538. 
54 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, para. 104. 
55 Ibid., para. 105. 
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From all regional systems for the protection of human rights the European 
convention system is the most advanced one. Firstly, the ECtHR has the compulsory 
jurisdiction, which means that after the Protocol 11 came into force the state parties to the 
ECHR can not choose whether or not to recognize the jurisdiction of the ECtHR to receive 
individual applications. Now the individual complaint process is compulsory to all 
European states that ratified the ECHR. Secondly, the individuals themselves appear before 
the ECtHR and participate in the proceedings as a party. This is also the result of the 
Protocol 11. Thirdly, the ECtHR’s judgments are binding on states parties which undertake 
to comply with them. Under article 46 § 2 of the ECHR the Committee of Ministers has the 
supervisory function over the execution of the ECtHR’s final judgments. In practice, all the 
judgments are transmitted to the Committee of Ministers and the respondent governments 
report on what measures they have been taking in response to judgments. The Committee 
of Ministers is concerned firstly if just satisfaction has been paid and individual measures 
have been taken that benefit the applicant. Subsequently, the Committee of Ministers 
monitors what general measures designed to prevent further violations have been taken.56 
Hence under the European convention system there is established an effective mechanism 
ensuring enforcement of judgments.  
The ECtHR’s requests of provisional measures are almost always complied with. In 
the Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey case (discussed below), the ECtHR commented that 
cases where states parties fail to comply with provisional measures indications are very 
rare.  
 
The binding effect of provisional measures was discussed by the ECtHR in Cruz 
Varas and Others v. Sweden case. The case concerned the former Commission’s power to 
indicate binding provisional measures. The ECtHR had to decide whether Sweden’s failure 
to comply with the Commission’s indication had violated the obligation not to hinder the 
effective exercise of the right to individual application. The ECtHR ruled that in the 
absence of specific provision in the ECHR, such Commission’s indications can not be 
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considered as giving rise to binding obligations to state parties57 and therefore it found no 
violation of the Sweden’s duty not to hinder the effective exercise of the right to individual 
petition. The same view was confirmed by the ECtHR on its own provisional measures in 
the case of Conka v. Belgium.58 
In the case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey the ECtHR has taken a different 
approach on the issue. 
 
 
3.2.2.1 The Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey case 
 
In this case the applicants were two Uzbek nationals and the members of an 
opposition party in Uzbekistan. Mr. Mamatkulov had entered Turkey on a tourist visa in 
March 1999 and Mr. Askarov on a false passport in December 1998. Uzbekistan requested 
their extradition in order to charge the applicants with homicide, causing injuries through 
the explosion of a bomb in Uzbekistan and an attempted terrorist attack on the President of 
Uzbekistan. The applicants were arrested by the Turkish police in March 1999. In the 
hearings in the Turkish Criminal Court it was held that the offences that the applicants were 
charged with were not political or military in nature but ordinary criminal offences. It was 
ordered to remand the applicants in custody pending the extradition. The applicants 
appealed against the extradition orders but the appeals were dismissed. The applicants filed 
petitions to the ECtHR. On 27 March 1999 the applicants were extradited to Uzbekistan 
despite the ECtHR’s indications to the Turkish government under Rule 39 of the Rules of 
Court not to extradite the applicants to Uzbekistan. The Turkish government received the 
assurances from the Uzbek authorities that the applicants would not be sentenced to death 
or subjected to torture. On 28 June 1999 the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan had found the 
applicants guilty of the offences charged and had sentenced them to terms of imprisonment. 
The applicants maintained in their applications to the ECtHR that, inter alia, by extraditing 
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58 Leach (2005) p. 42. 
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them to Uzbekistan despite the measure indicated by the ECtHR under the Rule 39, Turkey 
had failed to comply with its obligations under article 34 of the ECHR.  
Article 34 of the ECHR embodies the right of individual petition. The second 
sentence of the provision imposes on states parties the obligation not to hinder the effective 
exercise of this right which means the duty to refrain from any act or omission that would 
hinder individuals to exercise their right to individual application. 
The case first went to the Chamber, which in its judgment of 6 February 2003 held 
that by failing to comply with the interim measures Turkey was in breach of its obligations 
under article 34 of the ECHR. 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in its judgment of 4 February 2005 stated that 
the fact that the respondent government failed to comply with the measures indicated by 
the ECtHR under Rule 39 raises the question of whether the respondent state was in breach 
of its undertaking under article 34 of the ECHR not to hinder the applicants in the exercise 
of their right to individual application. 
 First of all, it recalled what the ECtHR previously stated that the provision 
concerning the right of individual petition is one of the fundamental guarantees of the 
effectiveness of the European convention system of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The right to individual application has “over the years become of high 
importance and is now a key component of the machinery for protecting the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Convention.”59 The undertaking not to hinder the effective 
exercise of the right of individual application precludes any interference with the 
individual’s right to present and pursue his complaint before the ECtHR effectively.60  
The Grand Chamber then paid attention to Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It stressed 
that the ECtHR applies Rule 39 only in restricted circumstances. Provisional measures are 
being indicated only in limited spheres, where there is an imminent risk of irreparable 
damage. The provisional measure “is sought by the applicant, and granted by the Court, in 
order to facilitate the “effective exercise” of the right of individual petition under Article 34 
of the Convention in the sense of preserving the subject matter of the application when that 
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is judged to be at risk of irreparable damage through the acts or omissions of the 
respondent State.” 61 In this case, as the ECtHR put it, as a result of the applicants’ 
extradition to Uzbekistan the level of protection that the ECtHR could have afforded was 
irreversibly reduced.  
While interpreting the ECHR, the Grand Chamber relied on the article 31 § 3 (c) of 
VCLT which states that consideration must be given to “any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.” It went on by viewing over the relevant 
decisions and orders of international courts and institutions that had stressed the importance 
and purpose of provisional measures. It also referred to the ICJ’s decision in the LaGrand 
case. Moreover, the Grand Chamber remembered the decision in Cruz Varas and Others v. 
Sweden and emphasized that the case dealt with not the Court’s but the former 
Commission’s power to issue provisional measures. Since the Commission had no power to 
issue binding decisions on states parties and its competence with regard to the merits of 
cases was only of preliminary nature, it neither had power to indicate binding provisional 
measures.62 Regarding the decision in Conka v. Belgium where the respondent government 
expelled Slovakian applicants of Roma origin despite the ECtHR’s indication of 
provisional measures, the Grand Chamber observed that the ECtHR had expressed the view 
by stating that the respondent government’s conduct was “difficult to reconcile with good 
faith co-operation with the Court”.63 
After reiterating the principles that the ECtHR should not depart, without good 
reason, from its own precedents and that the ECHR is a living instrument which must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions, the Grand Chamber noted that “in the 
light of the general principles of international law, the law of the treaties and international 
case-law, the interpretation of the scope of interim measures cannot be dissociated from the 
proceedings to which they relate or the decision on the merits they seek to protect.” 64 It 
observed that international case law has confirmed that “the preservation of the asserted 
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rights of the parties in the face of the risk of irreparable damage represents an essential 
objective of interim measures in international law.” 65 
Furthermore, the Grand Chamber ruled on the interpretation of article 13 of ECHR. 
It held that the right to an effective remedy in deportation and extradition proceedings 
requires those remedies to be with suspensive effect. “The notion of an effective remedy 
under Article 13 of the Convention requires a remedy capable of preventing the execution 
of measures that are contrary to the Convention and whose effects are potentially 
irreversible. Consequently, it is inconsistent with Article 13 for such measures to be 
executed before the national authorities have examined whether they are compatible with 
the Convention.” 66 This principle of effectiveness of remedies for the protection of an 
individual’s human rights, being applied in domestic legal systems, the same way can be 
applied in the international proceedings before the ECtHR with provisional measures 
having binding effect.  
Subsequently, the ECtHR held: 
[…] interim measures […] play a vital role in avoiding 
irreversible situations that would prevent the Court from properly 
examining the application and, where appropriate, securing to the 
applicant the practical and effective benefit of the Convention rights 
asserted. Accordingly, in these conditions a failure by a respondent State 
to comply with interim measures will undermine the effectiveness of the 
right of individual application guaranteed by Article 34 and the State’s 
formal undertaking in Article 1 to protect the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Convention. 67  
 
Consequently, as the facts of the case showed, the extradition of the applicants to 
Uzbekistan by Turkey prevented the ECtHR from examining properly their complaints and 
affording them protection against the alleged potential violations of the Convention. As a 
result, the applicants were denied the effective exercise of their right of individual 
application.  
Finally, the Grand Chamber concluded that “a failure by a Contracting State to 
comply with interim measures is to be regarded as preventing the Court from effectively 
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examining the applicant’s complaint and as hindering the effective exercise of his or her 
right and, accordingly, as a violation of Article 34.” 68 Thus, by failing to comply with the 
interim measures indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Turkey was in breach of 
its obligation under Article 34 of the ECHR.  
 
Thus the ECtHR based the binding nature of provisional measures essentially on 
article 34 that is the right of individual application. The conclusion of the majority in the 
Grand Chamber has to be understood as recognizing that the mere fact that the responding 
state has failed to comply with an indication of provisional measures per se constitutes a 
violation of article 34 of the ECHR.  
This decision of the majority raised some criticism within the Grand Chamber itself. 
It was criticized that since the states have always refused to attribute the binding force to 
provisional measures, the ECtHR is not able to impose on the states obligations without 
their consent. That being so, if a state’s refusal to comply with provisional measures 
actually hindered the applicant to exercise his individual application effectively, it would 
constitute a violation of the state’s undertaking not to hinder the exercise of the right of 
individual application. However, if, despite a state’s refusal to comply with provisional 
measures, the applicant was still able to exercise his right of individual application 
effectively and the ECtHR was able to examine the application properly, it should be no 
violation of the article of the ECHR.69 Additionally, it has been contended that article 34 of 
the ECHR can not serve as the basis for the binding force of provisional measures, since 
the deriving of binding character of provisional measures from the effective exercise of the 
individual application opens the question whether measures indicated in the inter-state 
complaints procedures according to article 33 of the ECHR would continue to be optional. 
It has also been said that the ECtHR can not rely on the decision of ICJ in the LaGrand 
case, since there ICJ interpreted its own constitutive treaty – article 41 of the Statute of the 
Court, meanwhile the constitutive treaty of the ECtHR is silent about the ECtHR’s powers 
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in relation to provisional measures. In this sense, the Grand Chamber has been accused of 
exercising a legislative function instead of a judicial one.70 
It is true that reliance on article 34 of ECHR as a basis for the binding force of 
provisional measures raises legal inaccuracies in regard to inter-state complaints or 
provisional measures addressed towards applicants (like in the Ilascu and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia case). The ECtHR will have to clarify these matters in the future. 
However, the argumentation that the failure to comply with provisional measures 
entails a violation of article 34 of ECHR only in cases where the effective exercise of 
applicants’ right of individual application was actually hindered also raises some doubts. It 
has to be kept in mind that the ECtHR issues requests for provisional measures only in 
restricted circumstances and only if there is an imminent risk of irreparable damage.71 
Usually the ECtHR grants provisional measures very rarely.72 In cases where they are 
granted, they have to be complied with without exception. A different approach opens the 
possibility for the state parties to choose whether to comply or not with provisional 
measures. At the same time the states are not in a position to foresee how the non-
compliance with provisional measures will affect applicants’ exercise of their right of 
individual application. This might only lead to additional breaches of the provisions of the 
ECHR. Whereas the awareness by the states that non-compliance with the ECtHR’s 
indicated provisional measures entails a responsibility over violations of the ECHR 
provisions would exclude further contravening practices and would increase the 
effectiveness of the international individual application proceedings.  
Meanwhile, the ECtHR’s ruling in the Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey case 
made a significant turn in the case-law on the matter and was cited many times in the 
subsequent cases. 
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3.2.2.2 Subsequent case-law and the Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain case 
 
Following the Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey case the ECtHR on several 
occasions ruled that the responding governments by failing to comply with provisional 
measures had violated article 34 of the ECHR. 
The Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia case concerned the extradition by 
Georgia of the five applicants of Chechen origin to Russia. In that respect, the ECtHR 
noted that due to the applicants’ extradition the effective exercise of their right of 
individual application was “seriously obstructed.” “The fact that the Court was able to 
complete its examination of the merits of the complaints against Georgia does not mean 
that the hindrance to exercise of that right did not amount to a breach of Article 34 of the 
Convention.”73 
In the Aoulmi v. France the applicant was deported to Algeria notwithstanding the 
ECtHR’s indication of provisional measure not to expel him. The ECtHR stressed that “in 
the present case, even though the binding nature of measures adopted under Rule 39 had 
not yet been expressly asserted at the time of the applicant's expulsion, Contracting States 
were nevertheless already required to comply with Article 34 and fulfil their ensuing 
obligations.” 74 
In all the above-mentioned cases the ECtHR concluded the fact that the applicants 
by their expulsion to the distant countries were hindered in the effective exercise of their 
right of individual application guaranteed by article 34 of the ECHR. However, in the 
Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain case where the ECtHR had a chance to answer the question 
whether the non-compliance with provisional measures entails a violation of article 34 even 
in cases where applicants were not actually hindered in the exercise of their right of 
individual application, the ECtHR had to conclude the opposite.  
The case concerned a Peruvian national, a suspected member of a terrorist 
organization in Peru with an aim to transform Peru’s political system by armed force into a 
communist proletarian regime. The applicant was arrested in Spain under an international 
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arrest warrant issued by Peruvian authorities and taken into custody pending a ruling on his 
extradition. In a decision of 18 July 2003, the Spanish court authorized the applicant’s 
extradition for trial in Peru on the charge of terrorism after receiving guarantees from the 
Peruvian authorities that the applicant would not be subjected to punishment causing 
physical harm or to inhuman or degrading treatment. On 6 August 2003, the applicant 
lodged an application to the ECtHR and requested for the application of the provisional 
measures to have his extradition suspended. On the same day, the ECtHR indicated 
provisional measure to the Spanish government not to extradite the applicant while the case 
is pending before the ECtHR. However, the applicant was extradited to Peru the next day. 
The ECtHR asked the Spanish government to indicate what steps had been taken to ensure 
the implementation of the provisional measure, but received no reply. In its final 
observations the applicant relied on article 34 of the ECHR alleging that the failure to 
comply with the provisional measure indicated in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of 
Court had prevented the ECtHR from effectively examining his application. He based his 
arguments on the case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey. The ECtHR was unable to 
conclude that the applicant was hindered in the exercise of his right of individual 
application since the applicant had been released from the Peruvian prison three months 
later and had been constantly in touch with his counsel in London. However, the ECtHR 
stated that “that fact, which became known after the decision to apply the interim measure 
had been taken, does not mean that the Government complied with their obligation not to 
hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right enshrined in Article 34.”75After 
reiterating the principles established in the aforementioned cases the ECtHR held: 
An interim measure is provisional by nature and the need for it is 
assessed at a given moment because of the existence of a risk that might 
hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application 
protected by Article 34. If the Contracting Party complies with the 
decision to apply the interim measure, the risk is avoided and any 
potential hindrance of the right of application is eliminated. If, on the 
other hand, the Contracting Party does not comply with the interim 
measure, the risk of hindrance of the effective exercise of the right of 
individual application remains, and it is what happens after the decision 
of the Court and the government's failure to apply the measure that 
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determines whether the risk materialises or not. Even in such cases, 
however, the interim measure must be considered to have binding force. 
The State's decision as to whether it complies with the measure cannot be 
deferred pending the hypothetical confirmation of the existence of a risk. 
Failure to comply with an interim measure indicated by the Court because 
of the existence of a risk is in itself alone a serious hindrance, at that 
particular time, of the effective exercise of the right of individual 
application.76 
 
To that extent, the ECtHR found that by failing to comply with provisional measure 
indicated in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Spain violated article 34 of the 
ECHR.  
 
Thus, the ECtHR ruled that a failure by a state party to comply with provisional 
measures per se constitutes a violation of article 34 of the ECHR. A provisional order of 
the ECtHR imposes a binding obligation on states to stay an extradition or deportation 
while a case is pending before the ECtHR. This obligation can not be conditional and 
dependent on the subsequent evaluation of the conduct of a state party. 
As it was mentioned before, a relevant Chamber can request from the respondent 
state information concerning the implementation of provisional measures indicated. 
Additionally, according to the Rule 39 § 2 notice of any provisional measure has to be 
given to the Committee of Ministers. In accordance with this provision, it is the Committee 
of Ministers that could be empowered to supervise the enforcement of provisional 
measures. On the other hand, provisional measures require urgent action: in some cases it is 
a matter of several hours. To that extent, this recourse to the Committee of Ministers would 
not be particularly helpful. Hence the compliance with provisional measures depends only 
on the good will of a respondent state. The awareness among states that orders of 
provisional measures are binding should be sufficient and the lack of a special enforcement 
mechanism should not be argued as a problem. 
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3.2.3 The Inter- American Court of Human Rights 
 
Article 63 § 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (further ACHR or 
American Convention) authorizes the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (further 
IACtHR) “in cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid 
irreparable damage to persons” to issue “such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in 
matters it has under consideration”. According to article 25 of the Rules of Procedure the 
IACtHR may issue provisional measures on its own motion or at the request of a party. In 
cases which are at the stage of being examined in the Inter-American Commission (further 
the Commission), the IACtHR can act at the request of the former.  
Provisional measures are a well-established institution in the Inter-American system 
of human rights. First of all, the American Convention embodies this institution of 
provisional measures as one of the main functions of the IACtHR. Therefore the IACtHR 
adopts them quite often, almost in every case. Secondly, according to article 25 § 8 of the 
Rules of Procedure the IACtHR is obliged in its annual report to the General Assembly of 
the Organization of American States (further the OAS) to report on provisional measures 
that have been ordered and on the compliance with these measures by the state parties. This 
means the IACtHR itself has a task of monitoring the implementation of provisional 
measures by the state parties. 
The IACtHR usually adopts provisional measures in situations where it is 
necessary, for example, to protect witnesses who testify before the Commission or the 
IACtHR or to protect human rights activists and organizations. In the Honduran 
Disappearance cases the IACtHR ordered the Honduran government to take all necessary 
measures to protect two witnesses who had received death threats. Subsequently, although 
the two mentioned witnesses were not harmed, the other three witnesses in the case were 
assassinated.77 In the Girardo Cordona case where the president of a Colombian human 
rights organization was assassinated the IACtHR ordered Colombian authorities to take 
measures to protect other human rights workers in the organization and the family of the 
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deceased.78 The IACtHR has adopted provisional measures in the death penalty cases, for 
example, in the James et al. case Trinidad and Tobago was ordered to stay executions of 
several persons convicted with the death penalty while the case was pending in the 
Commission, and in cases where it was necessary to provide protection to allow victims to 
return to their homes, for example, in the Loayza Tamayo case the IACtHR ordered the 
Peruvian government to guarantee to the victim all the necessary security conditions for her 
safely to return to Peru.79 
In comparison with the European human rights system, the Inter-American system 
is limited. First of all, the IACtHR can exercise compulsory jurisdiction only over states 
parties to the ACHR that have accepted its jurisdiction in accordance with article 62 § 1 of 
the ACHR. Secondly, only the states parties and the Commission have a right to submit a 
case to the IACtHR. This means that individuals do not have locus standi to participate in a 
case before the IACtHR.80 Although considering the limitations of the system, the Inter-
American Commission and the American Court play a vital role in the promotion of human 
rights in the region. 
The binding force of the provisional measures is not so arguable issue in the Inter-
American system of human rights. The provision empowering the IACtHR to adopt such 
measures is enshrined in the American Convention itself and uses the words shall adopt 
rather than indicate which suggests that the drafters of the ACHR intended provisional 
measures to be binding. However, the compliance with provisional measures by states 
parties has not been uniform.81 The reason for this might be not the lack of awareness that 
provisional measures are binding, but the lack of respect for human rights in Latin 
American countries in general and a lack of resources to ensure the protection to the 
beneficiaries of provisional measures. That is why the IACtHR has been compelled to 
stress repeatedly in its orders that states have to comply with their international obligations 
in good faith – pacta sunt servanda.  
                                                 
78 Ibid, p. 323. 
79 Ibid, p. 324-325. 
80 In accordance with article 44 of the ACHR any person or a group of persons may lodge a petition to the 
Commission. 
81 State parties comply with 80 % of the IACtHR’s orders of provisional measures. See: Narrative Report: 
Introducing the New African Court on Human and People’s Rights (2006) p. 25. 
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In the James et al. case the IACtHR noted that the state parties to the American 
convention should comply with all the provisions of the ACHR including those relative to 
the operation of the Commission and the IACtHR. To that extent “in view of the 
Convention’s fundamental objective of guaranteeing the effective protection of human 
rights […], State parties must refrain from taking actions that may frustrate the restitutio in 
integrum of the rights of the alleged victims.”82 
In the Giraldo-Cordona v. Colombia case the IACtHR pronounced that: 
pursuant to the provision set forth in Article 63 (2) of the Convention, the 
adoption of provisional measures which have been ordered by the Court 
is binding upon the State, as the fundamental principle underlying the law 
on the responsibility of the State, supported by international case law, sets 
forth that the States must comply with the conventional obligations 
thereof in good faith (pacta sunt servanda).83 
 
Thus the IACtHR derived the binding character of provisional measures from the 
general principle of international law pacta sunt servanda, which means that state parties 
by ratifying the American Convention and by accepting the IACtHR’s jurisdiction have 
committed themselves to fulfilling the obligations deriving from this international treaty, 
including the obligation to comply with provisional measures ordered by the IACtHR.  
It is important in this respect to discuss the case of Hilaire, Constantine and 
Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago concerning the mandatory death penalties. In this 
case thirty two alleged victims had been sentenced to death penalties for committing 
murders in Trinidad and Tobago pursuant to 1925 Offences Against the Person Act 
“without analyzing the individual characteristics of the offender and the crime and without 
considering whether the death penalty was the appropriate punishment for that case”.84 
Their appeals were dismissed by the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal and 
subsequently by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. None of the alleged victims 
had a possibility to apply for amnesty or pardon of the death penalty. After the victims filed 
petitions to the Commission, the IACtHT had repeatedly issued orders of provisional 
                                                 
82 The Order of Provisional Measures of 27 may 1999 in James et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 9. Also: 
Pasqualucci (2003) p. 317 
83 The Order of Provisional Measures of 29 November 2006 in Giraldo-Cordona v. Colombia, para. 8. 
84 Judgment of 21 June 2002 in Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 90. 
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measures to stay executions of the convicted persons while the case was pending before the 
Commission or the IACtHR itself. Additionally, in its decision of 27 January 1999 the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that all the executions of death penalties in 
Trinidad and Tobago should be stayed if the persons under the death penalties lodged 
petitions to an international human rights body whether it would be the supervisory bodies 
of the Inter-American system or the UN Human Rights Committee.85 However, despite the 
order of 25 May 1999 where the IACtHR instructed Trinidad and Tobago “to take all 
necessary measures to prevent the life of Joey Ramiah, among others […], so that his case 
could continue being processed before the inter-American system”,86 the respondent state 
executed the victim on 4 June 1999. The IACtHR found that the execution constituted an 
arbitrary deprivation of the right to life since the victim was protected by the provisional 
measures order. The IACtHR stated that “the State of Trinidad and Tobago has caused 
irreparable damage to the detriment of Joey Ramiah, by reason of its disregard of a direct 
order of the Court and its deliberate decision to order the execution of this victim”.87 It also 
stressed “the seriousness of the State’s non-compliance in virtue of the execution of the 
victim despite the existence of Provisional Measures in his favour, and as such finds the 
State responsible for violating Article 4 of the American Convention”88, which embodies 
the right to life. 
                                                 
85 Thomas and Hilaire v. Baptiste et al. Also: Judgment of 21 June 2002 in Hilaire, Constantine and 
Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 84(q). 
86 Judgment of 21 June 2002 in Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 196. 
87 Ibid., para. 199. 
88 Ibid., para. 200. 
 37
3.2.4 African Court on Human and People’s Rights 
 
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Establishment on the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (further the Protocol) 
empowers the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (further the African Court) to 
issue provisional measures. According to article 27 § 2 of the Protocol “in cases of extreme 
gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons”, the African 
Court “shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems necessary”. The wording of the 
provision is very similar to the one authorizing the Inter-American Court to order 
provisional measures.  
The African Court is just newly established court89, which has not had a chance to 
rule on a case yet. According to article 2 of the Protocol, the African Court has a 
complementary protective mandate to the African Commission. Only the state parties to the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (further the Charter), the African 
Commission and the African Intergovernmental Organizations can submit a case to the 
African Court. Individuals can institute cases directly before it only if the state party to the 
Protocol have declared in accordance with article 36 § 6 that it accepts the African Court’s 
jurisdiction to receive cases from individuals. Knowing the constant difficulties of the 
African countries in ensuring human rights standards, this is a significant limitation of the 
African Court’s competence and its effectiveness in terms of increasing the protection of 
human rights in the continent. However, according article 30 of the Protocol judgments of 
the African Court are binding on states parties, which undertake “to comply with the 
judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time stipulated by the Court and 
to guarantee its execution”.90 According to article 29 § 2 the execution of judgments is 
monitored by the Committee of Ministers, while according to article 31 the African Court 
is also obliged to report to the Assembly of the African Union on the cases in which a state 
                                                 
89 See the first Activity Report of the Court for 2006.  
90 Article 30 of the Protocol. 
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party has not complied with its judgments. In this way supervision of compliance with 
judgments of the African Court is ensured.  
Clearly, the African Court will have to rule on the binding force of provisional 
measures in its future case-law. It is most plausible that it will follow the practice of the 
other international courts and will hold that provisional measures are obligatory. In its 
Rules of Procedure it will have to determine who will have a right to request provisional 
measures and how the African Court will exercise the power to grant them. The other 
question is whether the African Court will follow the example of the Inter-American Court 
and will consider adopting provisional measures not only when a case is transferred to it 
but also when a case is still pending before the African Commission and the Commission is 
requesting for provisional measures. In such a case, provisional measures would be ordered 
“with the full authority of the Court at an early stage of the proceedings”. 91 It also has to 
be determined what institution, whether the African Court itself or the Committee of 
Ministers (since it is committed to monitor the implementation of judgments), will be 
obligated to ensure the supervision of compliance with provisional measures. Such a 
supervision mechanism would enhance the effectiveness of provisional measures. 
                                                 
91 Naldi (2002) p. 9. 
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3.3 The Jurisprudence of International and Regional Quasi-judicial Bodies 
 
The human rights bodies that are discussed in this chapter are treaty monitoring 
bodies entrusted with the task to supervise the compliance with the human rights standards 
set by specific treaties which is primarily conducted through the examination of periodic 
reports submitted by states on their implementation of a given treaty guarantees. The treaty 
bodies also have competence to consider individual petitions or communications submitted 
by individuals alleging human rights violations. However, since their decisions in the 
individual complaint procedure are referred to as views or reports, they are considered as 
non-binding. Although, the fact that their constituent treaties lack the provisions describing 
views or reports binding does not mean that states parties are free to choose whether to 
comply with them or to ignore them. They nevertheless include obligations that states 
parties have accepted that is to ensure human rights enshrined in the certain treaties.  
However, since the treaty bodies lack competence to render binding final decisions, 
it is accepted by states that these bodies also lack competence to issue binding provisional 
measures. Nonetheless, the treaty organs themselves stated in their case law that states are 
bound by requests of provisional measures on the basis of their obligation to cooperate in 
good faith with the treaty organs. 
 
 
3.3.1 The UN Human Rights Committee 
 
The Human Rights Committee is a monitoring body of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (further ICCPR). According to the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR the Committee has a competence to consider communications from individuals 
subject to the jurisdiction of states that ratified the Optional Protocol. The Committee after 
considering the communication adopts views which do not have legally binding effect. The 
Optional Protocol establishing the Committee contains no provision empowering it to issue 
provisional measures. However, the Committee assumed the power while drafting its Rules 
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of Procedure. Rule 92 (old Rule 86) of Rules of Procedure 92 entitles the Committee to 
“inform of its Views as to whether interim measures may be desirable to avoid irreparable 
damage to the victim of the alleged violation”.  
Since the Committee’s views have “rather a persuasive quasi-legal authority”93 the 
binding nature of provisional measures becomes a questionable issue. Nevertheless, the 
Committee itself has repeatedly stated in its jurisprudence that failure to comply with 
Committee’s request for provisional measures is a breach of obligations under the Optional 
Protocol. 94  
In the Sultanova et al. v. Uzbekistan case the victims, the sons of the author of the 
communication, were sentenced to death for a number of crimes as alleged against the 
constitutional regime in Uzbekistan. The Committee, in accordance with Rule 92 (old Rule 
86), requested the state party to stay the execution pending the determination of the case by 
the Committee. The author of the communication alleged that her sons were executed after 
the provisional measures request. The Committee received no reply from the state party on 
the request of provisional measures and no explanations in relation to the allegations that 
the executions were carried out after the communication was sent to the Committee and 
after the provisional measures were issued.  
The Committee reiterated the principles that it elaborated in its earlier decisions. It 
stated that:  
[…] by adhering to the Optional Protocol, a State party to the Covenant 
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of 
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant […]. Implicit in a State’s 
adherence to the Protocol is an undertaking to cooperate with the 
Committee in good faith so as to permit and enable it to consider such 
communications, and after examination to forward its views to the State 
party and to the individual […]. It is incompatible with these obligations 
for a State party to take any action that would prevent or frustrate the 
Committee in its consideration and examination of the communication, 
and in the expression of its Views. 95 
                                                 
92 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee adopted 22 September 2005, renumbered 
some of the rules. Rule 86 is renumbered to Rule 92. 
93 Naldi (2004) p. 446. 
94 See: Piandiong et al. v. The Philippines; Weiss v. Austria; Khalilov v. Tajikistan. 
95 Sultanova et al. v. Uzbekistan, para. 5.2. 
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The Committee added that “interim measures pursuant to rule 92 of the Committee’s rules 
of procedure are essential to the Committee’s role under the Protocol. Flouting of the Rule, 
especially by irreversible measures such as the execution of the alleged victims, 
undermines the protection of Covenant rights through the Optional Protocol”.96 
 
 
3.3.2 The UN Committee against Torture 
 
The UN Committee against Torture is a body monitoring the implementation of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (further CAT) by its state parties. According to the CAT the Committee 
considers individual complaints or communications from individuals claiming that their 
rights under the CAT were violated. Rule 108 § 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Committee enables it to adopt provisional measures in the individual complaint 
proceedings. According to the provision the Committee, its working group or the 
Rapporteur for new complaints and interim measures “may transmit to the State party 
concerned, for its urgent consideration, a request that it take such interim measures as the 
Committee considers necessary to avoid irreparable damage to the victim or victims of 
alleged violations”.  
Article 3 of the CAT prohibits the state parties to expel, return or extradite a person 
to a third country “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture”. The complainants to the Committee invoke this 
provision and request for provisional measures in a large number of cases in order to 
contest imminent extradition or deportation.97 
                                                 
96 Ibid. para. 5.2  
97 Annual Report of the Committee against Torture of 1 November 2006. 
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In the case of Cecilia Rosana Núñez Chipana v. Venezuela, where the Peruvian 
national was extradited to Peru despite the fact that the stay of extradition had been 
requested, the Committee stated: 
[…] the State party, in ratifying the Convention and voluntarily 
accepting the Committee's competence under article 22, undertook to 
cooperate with it in good faith in applying the procedure. Compliance 
with the provisional measures called for by the Committee in cases it 
considers reasonable is essential in order to protect the person in question 
from irreparable harm, which could, moreover, nullify the end result of 
the proceedings before the Committee.98 
 
 
3.3.3 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
 
The American Convention, entrusting the Inter-American Commission with the 
competence to consider individual petitions, contains no provision empowering it to issue 
provisional measures. Although in accordance with article 25 § 1 of the Commission’s 
Rules of Procedure, the Commission can “request that the State concerned adopt 
precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons”. The Commission has a 
discretion to request such measures “in serious and urgent cases, and whenever necessary 
according to the information available”. 
In the case of Juan Raul Garza v. United States in relation to the United States’ 
submissions on the non-binding nature of the Commissions precautionary measures, the 
Inter-American Commission stated that ”OAS member states, by creating the Commission 
and mandating it through the OAS Charter and the Commission’s Statute to promote the 
observance and protection of human rights of the American peoples, have implicitly 
undertaken to implement measures of this nature where they are essential to preserving the 
Commission’s mandate.”. It stated that member state’s failure to preserve life of a victim in 
capital cases while a case is pending before the Commission deprives the victim of his right 
                                                 
98 Cecilia Rosana Núñez Chipana v. Venezuela, para. 8. 
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of individual petition to the Inter-American human rights system and is inconsistent with 
the state’s basic human rights obligations.99 
 
 
3.3.4 The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
 
The African Commission established under the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights has a mandate “to promote human and people’s rights and ensure their 
protection in Africa”.100 According to article 55 of the ACHPR the Commission has a 
competence to receive communications from individuals, groups of individuals and NGOs 
alleging violations of the Charter. The Commission is a relatively more monitoring body 
lacking competence to render binding decisions that are the final result of the individual 
complaint procedure. Similarly, the Commission has no competence to enforce its 
decisions and lacks resources to monitor the compliance with its decisions.101 
The African Commission’s constituent treaty, the Charter, contain no provision 
empowering it to issue provisional measures. However, article 111 of its Rules of 
Procedure does. Article’s § 1 allows the Commission to “inform the state party concerned 
of its views on the appropriateness of taking provisional measures to avoid irreparable 
damage being caused to the victim of the alleged violation”. In accordance with Rule 
111 § 2 the Commission “may indicate to the parties any interim measures, the adoption of 
which seems desirable in the interests of the parties or the proper conduct of the 
proceedings before it.” When the Commission is not in session its Chairman can take a 
decision to indicate provisional measures or in case of urgency may take any necessary 
action on behalf of the Commission.102  
Even though the African Commission lacks effective judicial tools in order to 
become a successful human rights protection and enforcement body, in its jurisprudence 
                                                 
99 Pascualucci (2005) p. 24 (citing the Juan Raul Garza v. United States case). 
100 Article 30 of the ACHPR. 
101 Pityana (2004) p. 126. 
102 Rule 111 § 2 and § 3 of Rules of Procedure. 
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the Commission has made it clear that state parties are obliged to comply with 
Commission’s decisions on provisional measures. In the International Pen, Constitutional 
Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organization 
v. Nigeria case the Commission had to deal with the situation where the victim, Ken Saro-
Wiwa, writer and activist, was executed despite the Commission’s indicated provisional 
measures to stay the execution. The Commission noted that since Nigeria was a party to the 
African Charter it was bound by article 1 which embodies the general obligation of the 
state parties to respect and to ensure the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the 
Charter. The Commission’s task was to assist state parties to implement their obligations 
under the Charter. It stated: 
Rule 111 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure […] aims at preventing 
irreparable damage being caused to a complainant before the 
Commission. Execution in the face of the invocation of Rule 111 defeats 
the purpose of this important rule. The Commission had hoped that the 
Government of Nigeria would respond positively to its request for a stay 
of execution pending the former’s determination of the communication 
before it.103 
 
Therefore the Commission held that “in ignoring its obligations to institute 
provisional measures, Nigeria has violated Article 1”.  
 
                                                 
103 International Pen and Others v. Nigeria, p. 114. Also: Naldi (2002) p. 7. 
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4 Conclusions 
 
The international human rights bodies that are entrusted with the competence to monitor 
the compliance by states with international human rights standards through the exercise of 
individual complaint procedure are entitled to issue provisional measures of protection in 
order to safeguard the rights of individuals, victims of alleged human rights violations, 
from irreparable damage.  
 In international human rights law provisional measures have a fundamentally 
protective purpose. They are designed to protect potential victims from human rights 
violations and to deter states from breaching human rights.  
 Individual complaint procedure is a crucial international mechanism designed for 
the protection of human rights at an international stage. The right to petition international 
human rights bodies is an international procedural right granted to individuals directly by 
international law, regardless of whether or not this right is established by national laws of 
states. The substantive human rights, in contrast, may be exercised only within national 
legal systems. If a state is not willing to ensure substantive human rights to individuals in 
its jurisdiction, the victims of human rights violations are left with the only legal remedy 
that is the exercise of their international right to lodge a complaint to international human 
rights body in order to seek justice. In this case individuals are dependent on that the 
international legal remedy would be effective.  
 The binding nature of provisional measures issued by international judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies is necessary to the effectiveness of international individual complaint 
proceedings. This was confirmed by the ECtHR in its decision in the Mamatkulov and 
Askarov v. Turkey case where the ECtHR stated that its requests for provisional measures 
are binding on states as it is essential to the effectiveness of the right to individual petition.  
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In recent years the main international courts have pronounced in their decisions that 
provisional measures are binding on states and that states have an international obligation 
to implement them. The most authoritative decision on the issue is the ICJ’s decision in the 
LaGrand case where the Court based the binding nature of provisional measures issued by 
it on the effective exercise of the judicial function. Additionally, the IACtHR in its decision 
in the Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras case stated that its power to order provisional 
measures derives from its inherent character as a judicial body. This means that inherent 
judicial powers of an international court or tribunal give a basis for issuance of binding 
provisional measures. ICJ and the IACtHR are entitled to issue provisional measures by 
their constituent treaties, while the ECtHR’s power to make requests of provisional 
measures is enshrined in its procedural rules. Nonetheless, the ECtHR is an international 
court and its judgments are binding on states parties. Its inherent character as a judicial 
body gives basis for its power to issue binding provisional measures. Consequently, it can 
be concluded that to date in accordance with international law provisional measures 
ordered by international courts and tribunals have a binding effect on states and create for 
states a binding international obligation to implement them. 
The human rights bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN 
Committee against Torture, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the 
African Commission of Human Rights are treaty monitoring bodies. They lack competence 
to render binding decisions that are the final result of international petition proceedings 
exercised under their competence. In their jurisprudence these treaty monitoring bodies 
have pronounced that their requests for provisional measures are binding on states parties 
on the basis of their international obligation to cooperate with them and that failure by 
states parties to comply with them constitutes a violation of that obligation. It has been 
argued by states that provisional measures issued by quasi-judicial bodies do not have 
binding effect because they have no competence to render binding final decisions.  
However, if a treaty body lacks competence to render binding final decisions, it 
does not mean that it also lacks competence to issue binding provisional measures. 
Provisional measures in international law are of fundamentally protective nature and are 
aimed at preventing the rights of individuals from irreparable damage. Provisional 
 47
measures are interrelated to the procedural right of individual petition. States that accepted 
the right of individual petition to individuals in their jurisdictions have committed 
themselves not to hinder individuals to exercise that right. The treaty bodies’ task is to 
ensure that the individual petition proceedings would be effective and to prevent 
individuals from human rights violations by affording them specific protection. Provisional 
measures are applied by human rights bodies in the individual petition proceedings only 
under extreme circumstances, in cases that require specific protection. The treaty bodies’ 
competence to order binding provisional measures is interrelated to the competence to 
exercise effective individual petition proceedings. Therefore, the competence of a human 
rights body to issue binding provisional measures is different from the competence to 
render binding decisions and they are not correlated. Consequently, it can be suggested that 
provisional measures issued by quasi-judicial bodies are binding on states.  
In their future jurisprudence the discussed treaty organs will need to continue to 
develop the question and to state more clearly that states parties have an obligation to 
implement requests for provisional measures. The binding effects of provisional measures 
issued by treaty monitoring bodies would strengthen their judicial nature and would 
increase their legal authority in international human rights adjudication. 
In the future, the binding nature of provisional measures has a potential to develop 
into the general principle of law applicable as an integral part of international individual 
complaint proceedings. It requires that the main human rights bodies – international human 
rights tribunals and treaty monitoring bodies- would continue consistently rule on the 
binding character of provisional measures in international adjudication.  
The binding nature of provisional measures in international law gives basis for the 
development of a new level of protection in international human rights law that is 
protecting specific individuals under specific circumstances by specific means.  
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